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Abstract
We study the role of imitation within a model of economics with adaptive agents.
The basic ingredients are those of the Minority Game. We add the possibility of local
information exchange and imitation of the neighbour’s strategy. Imitators should
pay a fee to the imitated. Connected groups are formed, which act as if they were
single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result, leading to the
decrease of local social tensions. Size and stability of these areas depends on the
parameters of the model. Global performance measured by the attendance volatility
is optimised at certain value of the imitation probability. The social tensions are
suppressed for large imitation probability, but due to the price paid by the imitators
the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict, as
well as the requirements of low global and low local wealth differences.
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1 Introduction
The Minority Game introduced by Challet and Zhang [1,2] following the earlier
ideas of B. Arthur [3] became in recent years a playing ground for studying
various aspects of the economic systems.
In the Minority Game (MG) we have N players who choose repeatedly between
two options and compete to be in the minority group. This is the idealisation
of various situations, where the competition for limited resources leads to
intrinsic frustration. One can think for example of cars choosing between two
alternative routes or a speculator who tries to earn money by buying and
selling shares in such a manner that the majority takes the opposite action
than herself.
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Let us recall some well-known facts about the MG. The players share a public
information, saying what were the outcomes of the game in past M rounds.
The players interact only through this information. Therefore, the system has
a “mean-field” character, in the sense that no short-range interactions exist.
The self-organization is achieved by allowing players to have several strategies
and choose among them the strategy which seems to be the best one. This
feature leads to decrease of the fluctuations of attendance below its random
coin-tossing value, thus increasing the global effectivity of the system. It was
found that the relevant parameter is α = 2M/N and the maximum effectivity
is reached for α = αc ≃ 0.34 [2,4,5] and the properties of this phase transition
are thoroughly studied using the methods developed in the theory of neural
networks [6–8].
More complete account of the current state of the standard MG and its ram-
ifications is given in other contributions in these Proceedings [9]. We would
like to stress especially the attempts to go back to the economic motivations
of MG and model the market mechanisms [10–13].
The observation that the crowded (low α) phase exhibits low global effectivity
bears an important hint. Indeed, if we start with the crowded phase, we can
improve the performance by grouping the agents together. This mechanism
may bring about the condensation of individual investors around consulting
companies and investment funds, which is the behaviour found in real life.
Indeed, an individual investor who sees that she is all the time behind her
neighbors may feel tempted to refrain from her own initiative and transfer
the burden of decisions to more successful (more wealthy) individuals. That
is what we will call imitation. The temptation for imitation in the population
will be quantified by a parameter p ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, an agent, who is
otherwise prone to imitation, will not imitate, if she has larger wealth and
therefore is better off than her neighbors. So, there are be two questions to be
positively answered if the imitation is to occur: Has the agent natural tendency
to imitation? Has any of her neighbors larger wealth?
It is also natural to suppose that the decision-maker, or the imitated indi-
vidual, will use (or misuse) her position to require a fee from those on which
behalf her acts. Therefore, the imitators will pay a commission ε to the imi-
tated. As we will see, the value of the commission has important consequences
for the behavior of the agents.
We introduced recently [14] the possibility of local interactions into the stan-
dard MG. In this contribution we further analyse the properties of social
structures emerging from the local information exchange. When doing so we
go beyond the mean-field character of the usual MG. Related works were al-
ready done, either assuming that the global information is fully replaced by a
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local one [15] or using the MG scheme for evolving the Kauffmans’s Boolean
networks [16] to the critical state [17].
In our variant of the MG the local information is used to enable the play-
ers to decide, whether they want to use their own strategies or imitate their
neighbours. Indeed, it is quite common that people do not invest individually,
but rely on an advice from specialised agencies, or simply follow the trend
they perceive in their information neighbourhood. In so doing, the individuals
coalesce into groups, which act as single players. In the framework of Minority
Game, we will study the social structure induced by the occurrence of these
groups. It should be expected that this will lead to increase in the global per-
formance in the crowded (small α) phase. This is indeed confirmed by the
simulations.
2 Minority Game on a chain with allowed imitation
We introduce the possibility of local information exchange in our variant of the
Minority Game. In analogy to the metabolic pathways in living organisms we
can imagine a kind of “information metabolism” in work within the economic
system. Information flow along the edges of certain information network. The
study of the geometry of graphs describing these information networks is now
a scientific field on its own [18–20]. Within the framework of MG a linear
chain [15] and random network with fixed connectivity K [17] was already
investigated in different contexts.
Here we take the simplest possible choice of a linear chain with one-directional
nearest-neighbour connections. Each player can obtain the information only
from her left-hand neighbour, namely about her neighbour’s wealth.
There will be two conditions needed for a player to imitate her neighbour.
First, the player should have internal disposition for being an imitator. We
simplify the variety of risk-aversion levels by postulating only two types of
players. Each player has a label l˜ ∈ {1, 0} indicating, whether the player is
a potential imitator (l˜ = 1) or always a leader (l˜ = 0). At the beginning we
take each of the players and attribute her the label 1 with probability p and
label 0 with probability 1− p. We also allow swapping between the two types
of behaviour, at a constant rate. The labels can change at each step with
probabilities p1 (1 → 0) and p2 (0 → 1). We choose always p = p2/(p1 + p2),
so that the average density of potential imitators does not change in time.
The second condition for the player of the type 1 to actually imitate in the
current step is that her neighbour has larger accumulated wealth than the
player itself. We suppose that the player does not know what are the strate-
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gies of her neighbour, but if she observes that the neighbour’s behaviour is
more profitable than her own strategy, she relegates the decision to the neigh-
bour and takes the same action. The player of the type 0 will never imitate.
Therefore, she will always look only at her S strategies and choose the best
estimate from them.
The above rules are formalized as follows. We have an odd number N of
players. Each player has S = 2 strategies, denoted sj ∈ {1, 2}. The two possible
actions a player can take are 0 and 1. The winning action is 1 if most players
took 0 and vice versa. The members of teh winning side receive 1 point, the
loosing side 0 points. The players know the lastM outcomes of the game. This
information is arranged into the M-bit string µ ∈ {0, 1}M . The strategies are
tables attributing to each of 2M possible strings µ the action aµj,sj the player
j takes, if she chooses the strategy sj. The scores Uj,s of the strategies are
updated according to the minority rule
Uj,s(t+ 1) = Uj,s(t) + 1− δ(a
µ(t)
j,s − θ(
∑
i
ai(t)−N/2)) (1)
where aj(t) is the action the player j takes at time t.
The potential imitators will copy the action from their more successful neigh-
bours. Let Wj be the wealth of the j-th player and the variables lj describe
the actual state of imitation, in analogy with the labels l˜j describing potential
state of imitation. We can write lj = l˜j θ(Wj−1−Wj), with θ(x) = 1 for x > 0
and 0 otherwise. The actions of the players are
aj = ljaj−1 + (1− lj)aj,sM . (2)
We also suppose that the imitation is not for free. The player who imitates
passes a small fraction ε of its wealth increase to the imitated player. This rule
accounts for the price of information. Then, we update the wealth of players
iteratively,
∆Wj(t) = (1− εlj)(εlj+1∆Wj+1(t) + 1− δ(aj − θ(
∑
i
ai(t)−
N
2
)) (3)
where ∆Wj(t) =Wj(t+ 1)−Wj(t).
3 Imitation structures
In our simulations we observe that the time evolution of the number of actually
imitating players, Ni =
∑
j lj , depends on p1. The time dependence of the
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Fig. 1. Time dependence of the fraction of imitators, for N = 1001, M = 6, S = 2,
and p = 0.95, averaged over 10 independent runs. Different curves (marked by
symbols) correspond to different probability p1 = 0 (×), 5 · 10
−6 (✷), 1.5 · 10−5 (+)
5 · 10−5 (⊙), 5 · 10−4 (•), 5 · 10−3 (△).
fraction of imitators Ni/N for several values of p1 is shown in Fig. 1. For
p1 = 0 it increases monotonously until saturation, while for p1 6= 0 it grows
toward a local maximum and then decreases and saturates at a value weakly
dependent on p1, but significantly below the p1 = 0 value.
An example of the time evolution of the spatial wealth distribution is given
in Fig. 2 for p = 0.95 and two values of p1 = 5 · 10
−6 and p1 = 0. The
initially random distribution of wealth among players changes qualitatively
during the evolution of the system. Coherent groups of poor and wealthy
players are formed. Again, the situation is qualitatively different if we allow
the players to switch between potential imitator and leaders. We have shown
in the previous work [14] that for p1 = 0 the poor groups persist forever. We
can see the same behaviour also in Fig. 2 for p1 = 0. On the other hand, for
p1 6= 0 we observe that large poor groups are unstable and split again into
smaller clusters. This leads to lowering of the global wealth differences, as will
be analysed in the next section.
4 Globally uniform wealth versus small social tensions
The time averaged attendance fluctuations σ2 = 〈(A − N/2)2〉 measure the
distance from the global optimum. The global effectivity is higher for smaller
σ2. We investigated the influence of the imitation on the global effectivity.
We found that in the crowded phase the system becomes more efficient if
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Fig. 2. Example of the evolution of the distribution of wealth among players, for
N = 1001, M = 6, S = 2, ε = 0.05, and p = 0.95. The upper 5 curves correspond
to p1 = 5 · 10
−6, while the lower 5 curves have p1 = 0. The time step at which the
snapshot is taken is indicated on the right. For each time, the vertical axis indicates
the wealth Wj of the j-th player.
imitation is allowed (p > 0), but there is a local minimum in the dependence
of σ2/N on p, indicating that there is an optimal level of imitation, beyond
which the system starts to perform worse. The results for N = 1001 are shown
in Fig. 3. We can see that the minimum occurs at smaller values for larger M .
We can also observe that for longer memories (M = 7 in our case) the value
of the fluctuations for p = 1 is significantly above the value without imitation
(p = 0), while the value at the minimum still lies below the p = 0 value. This
implies that moderate imitation can be beneficiary, while exaggerated one can
be harmful.
The increase of spatial coherence by creation of poor and wealthy groups
can result in decrease of local social tension. To quantify it, we introduce a
kind of “utility function” [21] U(∆W ), which indicates, how much the wealth
difference ∆W is subjectively perceived. We will use the utility function in
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Fig. 3. Dependence of the attendance fluctuations on the imitation probability for
p1 = 0. The number of players is N = 1001 and memory length M = 5 (⊙), M = 6
(+), and M = 7 (×).
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Fig. 4. Relative local tension for N = 1001, M = 6, p1 = 0 measured by utility
function (∆W )1/2 for commission ε = 0.05 (✷), 0.03 (×), and 0.01 (+).
the form U(x) = x1/2. Then, the average measure of the local social tension is
d0.5 =
1
〈W 〉


N−1∑
j=1
|Wj −Wj+1|
1/2


2
(4)
where we denoted the average wealth 〈W 〉 = 1
N
∑N
j=1Wj .
The stationary values of the tension for various values of the commission ε
are shown in Fig. 4, for p1 = 0. An important feature of the p-dependence is
the maximum at certain imitation probability. The maximum becomes more
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Fig. 5. Growth of the average wealth of agents, for N = 1001, M = 6, S = 2,
p = 0.95, sample-averaged over 10 independent runs. Different curves (marked by
symbols) correspond to different probability p1 = 0 (×), 5 · 10
−6 (✷), 1.5 · 10−5 (+)
5 · 10−5 (⊙), 5 · 10−4 (•), 5 · 10−3 (△).
pronounced for larger commission ε, while for ε = 0.01 it disappears.
This observation has an important consequence. Imagine, we are social ex-
perimentalists starting with a system with no information exchange and no
imitation. Let us try to lower the social tensions by gradually encouraging
the people to buy information from the neighbours and imitate each other.
If the cost of the information (ε) is too high, this social strategy would fail,
because small increase in imitation would enhance the social tension. Lower
social tension must have been achieved by a macroscopic change in the social
behaviour: by jumping over the maximum in the function d0.5(p). This may
serve as a toy example of how too greedy environment (too costly information)
can prevent the system to find a global optimum.
By comparing the Figs. 3 and 4 we can also see that for high ε optimal
performance (minimum σ2/N) can be close to maximum in social tensions.
Therefore, in greedy environment the requirements of effectivity and social
peace are in conflict.
The Fig. 5 shows the growth rate of the average wealth for several values of
the switching probability p1. We can see that the growth rate converges to a
constant value, which is higher for p1 = 0 and nearly independent of p1 for
p1 6= 1. In all cases we confirm that the average wealth grows linearly with
time.
In the Fig. 6 we can see the time evolution of the local tensions for several
values of the switching probability p1. We observe that the switching enhances
the local tensions. On the other hand, in Fig. 7 we can see the time dependence
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Fig. 6. Time evolution of the local tensions, for N = 1001, M = 6, S = 2, p = 0.95,
sample-averaged over 10 independent runs. Different curves (marked by symbols)
correspond to different probability p1 = 0 (×), 5 · 10
−6 (✷), 1.5 · 10−5 (+) 5 · 10−5
(⊙), 5 · 10−4 (•), 5 · 10−3 (△).
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Fig. 7. Time evolution of the wealth dispersion, for N = 1001, M = 6, S = 2,
p = 0.95, averaged over 10 independent runs. Different curves (marked by symbols)
correspond to different probability p1 = 0 (×), 5 · 10
−6 (✷), 1.5 · 10−5 (+) 5 · 10−5
(⊙), 5 · 10−4 (•), 5 · 10−3 (△).
of the growth rate in the global wealth dispersion, 〈W 2〉 − 〈W 〉2 (by angle
brackets we denote the average over all players). There is a clear difference
between the cases of p1 = 0, where the wealth dispersion grows much more
rapidly than t2 and p1 6= 0, where the dispersion grows as t
2, at a rate nearly
independent of p1.
This means that if we allow switching between potential imitation and leader
states, the wealth distribution only re-scales linearly in time (This observation
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together with the linear growth if the average wealth suggests that the proba-
bility density at time t converge as P (W, t) = Φ(W/t) where the function Φ(x)
does not depend on time). On the contrary, if we forbid the switching, the poor
imitators are frozen forever in their poverty and in the wealth distribution the
rich and poor diverge steadily.
However, recalling the discussion of the Figs. 6 and 5 we can see that the
requirement of low global wealth dispersion (a “just” world, achieved by en-
abling the poor imitators switch to leaders and thus become richer) deterio-
rates both global efficiency (measured now by the wealth growth rate) and,
more surprisingly, the local social tensions.
5 Conclusions
We investigated the creation of rich and poor spatial domains due to local
information exchange, within the framework of the Minority Game (MG).
Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents emerge. Several macroscopic
conflicts of interest are observed in our model.
(1) We found that the effect of imitation leads to increased effectivity in the
crowded phase of MG. The price paid for the information needed to imitation
leads to the conflict between effectivity and local social tensions. High infor-
mation cost also prevents the system from coming to the state of lower social
tensions by gradual increase of the imitation probability.
(2) We allow for switching between imitation and non-imitation (leader) states.
Such a switching makes the global wealth differences smaller, but increases the
local social tensions.
The creation of coherent areas of poor and rich agents leads to decrease in the
local social tensions, but only if p is sufficiently close to 1. The lowest value of
the social tension is reached at p = 1, but for such a value the global effectivity
is significantly lower than its optimum value. Therefore, we observe a conflict
of local interests (maximisation of social tension) with global performance
(maximisation of attendance fluctuations).
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